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Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. The Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., a 




 Pursuant to NRS 239.010, the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), governmental entities 
are required to make available to the public, nonconfidential public records that the governmental 
entity has in its legal custody or control. If a governmental entity denies a request for public 
records, the person requesting such records may seek a court order to compel production. 
NRS 239.011(1). If the party requesting such records prevails, that party is entitled to receive 
attorney fees and costs. NRS 239.011(2).  
 This case asks whether the requesting party is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs 
when the parties reach an agreement that gives the requesting party access to the requested records 
before the court enters a judgment on the merits of the case. In response to this question, the Court 
adopts the catalyst theory, which provides that, “attorney fees may be awarded even when 
litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially 
because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation.”2  
 Accordingly, the Court affirms the district court’s decision that the Respondent, The Center 
for Investigative Reporting, Inc., is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs in a reasonable 
amount, pursuant to the NPRA under NRS 239.011(2). 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The rap artist, Tupac Shakur, was shot and killed at the intersection of Flamingo and Koval 
in Las Vegas, Nevada. The case remains an open investigation.  
 The Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc. (CIR) submitted a request to Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) in December 2017, for public records related to 
Tupac’s murder, pursuant to the NPRA. A month passed and LVMPD did not respond to the 
request, so CIR followed up, explaining that LVMPD was in violation of the NPRA’s five-day 
turnaround time for responding to such requests. LVMPD responded the same day, indicating that 
CIR’s request was submitted to a Public Information Officer.  
 Twelve days later, CIR followed up again and informed the Office of Public Information 
that the LVMPD had not fulfilled their request as required by the NPRA, for over one month. The 
Office of Public Information did not respond.  
 In March of 2018, approximately three months after CIR’s first request, CIR followed up 
again, and was ignored. Two weeks later, CIR’s counsel sent a letter to LVMPD’s Director of 
Public Information, explaining LVMPD’s obligations under the NPRA and demanded a response 
in the next seven days. Eight days later, LVMPD provided a two-page police report, but did not 
indicate whether additional records existed or whether such records were exempt.  
 CIR again contacted LVMPD and inquired whether it was withholding records and if so, 
pursuant to what statutory authority. The next day, LVMPD’s Assistant General Counsel 
responded that it would research CIR’s request and respond within thirty (30) days.  
 
1  Paige Silva, 2L. 
2  Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140,144 (Cal. 2004). 
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 LVMPD also stated that because Tupac’s murder was an open investigation, any other files 
were (i) not public records3, (ii) declared confidential by law, (iii) protected by “law enforcement 
privilege,” and (iv) protected because public policy outweighed the public’s interest in access to 
such records. CIR disputed LVMPD’s contentions and asked LVMPD to abide by its legal 
obligations under the NPRA. LVMPD insisted that the records were protected.  
 CIR filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, to inspect or obtain all records within 
LVMPD’s custody related to their request. The district court opined that LVMPD had not satisfied 
its burden to demonstrate the confidential nature of the requested records and gave LVMPD two 
options. The first, produce the records with necessary redactions; the second, participate in an in-
camera evidentiary hearing regarding the records’ confidentiality. LVMPD opted for the second 
option, and the district court scheduled the hearing. 
 However, before the hearing, LVMPD and CIR agreed that LVMPD would produce 
portions of its records with an index which would identify and describe any redacted or withheld 
records. CIR was then allowed to challenge LVMPD’s redactions and withholdings with the right 
to seek attorney fees and costs.4 LVMPD ultimately provided around 1,400 documents related to 
their request. 
 At a later status check, both parties disagreed as to whether CIR should receive attorney 
fees and costs. CIR asserted the catalyst theory, and LVMPD contended that CIR did not obtain a 
judgment in its favor because the parties reached an agreement before the court decided the merits 
of their case, and therefore could not receive attorney fees and costs. The district court ruled that 
CIR prevailed and instructed CIR to file a motion for attorney fees and costs.  
 CIR filed their motion, which LVMPD opposed. LVMPD argued that immunity from 
damages are provided under NRS 239.012 when records are withheld in good faith, and that CIR 
improperly filed for fees incurred prior to litigation, which should not be covered. The district 




 LVMPD contends that CIR is not entitled to attorney fees and costs because the district 
court never entered an order to compel production of the records.5 Furthermore, LVMPD contends 
that the district court should have applied the prevailing party standard rather than the catalyst 
theory.6 CIR contends that LVMPD provided the records because of CIR’s initial claim against it, 
and that the Court should apply the catalyst theory.  
 This is a question of statutory interpretation, reviewed de novo.7 If a statute is clear, the 
Court will not look beyond its plain language.8 When a statute is ambiguous, the Court looks to 
 
3  Under NEV. REV. STAT.§ 239.010(1). 
4  Pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.011(2). 
5  In the alternative LVMPD argues that it is immune because it acted in good faith. However, the Court rejected 
thatt argument in Clark County Coroner’s Office v. Las Vegas Review-Journal, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 5, P.3d (Feb. 27, 
2020). 
6  The prevailing party standard is laid out in Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 
Ne. 89, 343 P.3d 608 (2015). 
7  Clark Cty. Coroner’s Office, 136 Nev. Op. 5, P.3d. 
8  Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 
148 P.3d 790, 793 (2006). 
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legislative history for guidance, and considers the policy of the law, avoiding an interpretation 
which leads to absurd results.9 
 NRS 239.011(1) provides that when a governmental entity denies a request for public 
records, the requester can seek a court order.10 NRS 239.011(2) provides that, “if the requester 
prevails, the requester is entitled to recover his or her costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in the 
proceeding from the governmental entity whose officer has custody of the book or record.”11 The 
Legislature did not define “prevails.” 
 In Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., this Court held 
that a requester prevails under the NPRA if the requester “succeeds on any significant issue in 
litigation which achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing suit.”12 In this Court’s previous 
decisions, it awarded attorney fees to the “prevailing party,” however, the Legislature used the 
expansive term “prevails” in the language of NRS 239.011(2).13 Furthermore, the district court did 
not enter an order to compel production because the parties came to an agreement before the case 
was heard on the merits. Thus, this is an issue of first impression before this Court. 
 Other courts have declined to adopt a narrow requirement that requesters must obtain an 
order on the merits to “prevail” to receive attorney fees and costs under statutes similar to the 
NPRA.14 Such courts adopt the “catalyst theory,” in which “requestors are entitled to attorney’s 
fees under [the Act], absent a judgment . . . when they can demonstrate: (1) ‘a factual causal nexus 
between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately achieved’; and (2) ‘that the relief ultimately 
secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.’”15  
 Accordingly, the Court holds that a requester is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant 
to NRS 239.011(2) without a district court order compelling production, if the requester 
demonstrates, “a causal nexus between the litigation and the voluntary disclosure or change in 
position by the Government.”16 The court should consider the following factors: (1) “when the 
documents were released,” (2) “what actually triggered the documents’ release,” and (3) “whether 
[the requester] was entitled to the documents at an earlier time.”17 In addition, the court should 
consider “(1) whether the litigation was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, and (2) whether 
the requester reasonably attempted to settle the matter without litigation and allowed the 
government agency reasonable time to fulfill the request.”18  
 Applying the catalyst theory to the case at bar, the district court was correct in its 
determination that CIR prevailed under NRS 239.011(2). CIR attempted to resolve the matter 
without litigation, put LVMPD on notice and gave LVMPD ample opportunity to comply. 
LVMPD repeatedly failed to respond or explain its confidentiality belief, and it was not until CIR 
sought litigation that LVMPD agreed to produce the records. Thus, the facts indicate that CIR’s 
 
9  Id. 
10  NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.011(1). 
11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.011(2) (emphasis added). 
12  131 Nev. at 90, 343 P.3d at 615. 
13  See Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Valley Elect. Assn’n v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7, 10, 106 P.3d 
1198, 1200 (2005)). NEV. REV. STAT. 239.011(2). 
14  See, e.g., Belth v. Garamendi, 283 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831–32 (Ct. App. 1991); Uptown People’s Law Ctr. v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 7 N.E.3d 102, 108–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
15  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017, 1031 (N.J. 2008). 
16  First Amendment Coal., 878 F.3d at 1128.  
17  Id. at 1129.  
18  See Graham, 101 P.3d at 154–55.  
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lawsuit was the catalyst for LVMPD’s production of the records. Therefore, CIR “prevailed” under 
the NPRA and is entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
